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I. Introduction 
If a company suffers a wrong then prima facie it is the company that should seek redress for 
that wrong.[1] In most cases it is the majority of either the board of directors or the company 
in general meeting that acts as the company in making the decision as to whether it will 
commence or otherwise become involved in legal proceedings. There is good reason for this. 
It avoids the multiplicity of actions that would arise if individual shareholders or directors 
could take action in a company's name - some of which would likely be actions designed to 
harass, with the ulterior aim or achieving a personal benefit for the initiator, rather than to 
compensate the company. The derivative action in the Companies Act 1993 creates an 
exception. It confers standing on a single director or shareholder of a company to seek the 
leave of the High Court to bring proceedings in the name of or on behalf of a company or 
related company, or, to intervene in proceedings to which the company or related company is 
a party. 
Although the derivative action can clearly be used to pursue actions that the company has 
against outsiders the focus in this paper is on the role of the derivative action in the 
enforcement of directors' duties. The law has long recognised that a director of a company 
owes certain duties to that company.[2] In many ways there are incentives for a director to 
comply with these duties. Those who do not may face removal by the shareholders that 
appointed them. Alternatively, shareholders may vote with their feet and exit the company. In 
the case of a publicly listed company the market may operate to punish a wrongdoing 
director. If information about the misconduct is available to the market then this will likely be 
reflected in the price of the company's shares. It the price of its shares falls then a company 
becomes a more likely target for a takeover. The wrongdoing director is then at risk of being 
removed by a new controlling shareholder. However, in some circumstances a director's 
breach of a duty that he or she owes to the company will not result in adverse consequences 
of the aforementioned kind. The classic situation is where a director has or controls a 
majority shareholding. The director in such an instance will not be removed from office and 
nor will action be taken against him or her by the company. In the absence of the availability 
of a derivative action the position for dissenting minority shareholders would be bleak - 
particularly if they lacked a ready market for their shares and/or faced restrictions on their 
ability to sell their shares. Thus, at least in theory, it can be seen that the derivative action has 
a key role to play in the enforcement of directors' duties. Conventional analysis suggests that 
an effective derivative action plays a dual role this respect - it not only acts as a deterrent 
mechanism but in the case of actual wrongdoing it operates to compensate a company for the 
harm it has suffered because of the actions of a director.[3]  
The derivative action at common law was so circumscribed by the sub- rules that together 
made up the rule in Foss v Harbottle that it was ineffective as either a deterrence or 
compensatory mechanism.[4] The rule in Foss v Harbottle was made up of a number of parts. 
First, was the uncontroversial rule that if a wrong is done to the company then it is the 
company that must sue. Second, a minority shareholder was prevented from taking action in 
respect of a wrong that the majority of shareholders were able to do or approve. Third, a 
shareholder was able to exercise his or her vote on any matter that the majority was 
competent to deal with "although he may have a personal interest in the subject matter 
opposed to, or different from, the general or particular interests of the company."[5] A 
shareholder could take action in the company's name if he or she could establish two 
elements. First, that the wrong was one that was unable to be confirmed or ratified by the 
majority because it was a "fraud on the minority."[6] The problem was that the authorities on 
the subject of what exactly amounted to a fraud on the minority were difficult and 
conflicting.[7] The second element that a shareholder had to establish was that the 
perpetrators of the fraud were in control of the company - it being recognised that this did not 
necessarily mean that the perpetrators held more than 50% of the available votes.[8]  
The need for reform was accepted. The New Zealand Law Commission in its Report No 9 on 
Company Law Reform said of its proposed derivative action that:[9]  
Any shareholder, with the leave of the Court, may bring a derivative action to remedy 
a wrong done to the company ... This provision, which is modelled on the Canadian 
reforms, does away with the rule in Foss v Harbottle while preserving, through Court 
supervision, protection against abuse. 
These comments not only acknowledge the balancing act that the enacted derivative action 
must perform but suggest one measure of its practical effectiveness, that is, how does it rate 
when compared to the Canadian system on which it is modelled. This paper aims to assess 
this matter. However, to restrict the focus to this point would be to ignore the fact that the 
statutory derivative action is only one of a series of measures that those adversely affected by 
the actions of a director may elect to take. Thus, this paper also aims to assess the 
effectiveness of the statutory derivative action in the Companies Act 1993 in relation to the 
enforcement of directors' duties in the wider context in which it operates. 
II. Standing 
Section 165(1) of the Companies Act 1993 confers standing on a shareholder or a director of 
a company to seek the leave of the High Court to bring or intervene in proceedings on behalf 
of a company or a related company. This grant of standing is wider than that which existed at 
common law where a company's shareholders, but not its directors, could seek to act in its 
name. Nevertheless the grant of standing in the Companies Act 1993 is considerably 
narrower than that conferred by Canadian legislation. Section 239(1) of the Business 
Corporations Act[10] confers standing on a "complainant." Those falling within the definition 
of "complainant" in s 238 include directors and shareholders, both present and former, and 
"any other person who, in the discretion of the Court, is a proper person to make an 
application."[11]  
The grant of standing in the Canadian legislation reflects a view that corporate law should be 
self-enforcing so that all those who might be adversely affected by misconduct on the part of 
directors should be able to take action in respect of it.[12] Although, in theory, a wide grant 
of standing appears to have merit in the sense that it gives the derivative action teeth as a 
deterrent mechanism it gives rise to practical difficulties - difficulties to which the Canadian 
judiciary have paid heed. Human nature being what it is there is a greater risk that former 
shareholders and directors will be acting in their own interests rather than in the company's 
interests - an example being a desire to "pay back" those in the company against whom a 
grievance is harboured. Further, even if such applicants are not culled when other criteria for 
the granting of leave are taken into account they are likely, for the reason already identified, 
to require increased supervision if leave is granted. Thus, there exists a line of Canadian 
authority that, despite the statutory definition of "complainant", limits the standing of 
shareholders and directors to seek leave to bring a derivative action to those who are current 
shareholders or directors.[13] In Schafer v International Capital Corporation an application of 
a former director was declined because of a lack of what was described by Baynton J as 
"sufficient interest".[14] Bayton J continued:[15]  
Such a rule is required to distinguish between applicants who have a bona fide 
potential financial stake in the outcome of the derivative action and applicants who 
seek leave for an improper purpose ... The latter category of applicant has no right to 
meddle in the affairs of the company regardless of whether or not the derivative 
action is in the interests of the corporation. 
Similar difficulties also go to explain the mixed success that creditors have met in satisfying a 
court that they are "proper" persons to take proceedings in a company's name - the Canadian 
experience being that creditors have sought to utilise the derivative action in order put a 
company in funds to meet a debt that it would otherwise be unable to pay.[16] This only 
reflects the reality that the vast majority of creditors will not concern themselves with the 
actions of management of one of their debtors unless and until that debtor is unable to meet 
its obligations. The Companies Act 1993 does not ignore the impact that the actions of a 
director may have on a company's creditors.[17] There exist alternative methods by which a 
creditor can attempt to ensure that action is taken in respect of misconduct by a director - 
methods which avoid one creditor acting alone and so prevent the likely conflict between the 
interests of that creditor and the wider interests represented by the company. 
Creditors are granted standing to make application to appoint an independent individual, a 
liquidator, who could, of course, elect to pursue an available cause of action against a 
director.[18] Further, a creditor of a company in liquidation has standing pursuant to s 301(1) 
of the Companies Act 1993 to apply to the High Court for an inquiry as to whether a director 
or manager of the company has acted in breach of a duty owed to the company. If, after an 
inquiry, an order is made that the director repay or restore money or property, rather than 
contributing a sum to the assets of the company by way of compensation, then s 301(1)(c) 
gives the Court a discretion to order that any part of the property or funds that the director or 
manager is ordered to repay or restore to the company be paid or transferred to the applicant 
creditor.[19]  
Additionally, a creditor may seek an order pursuant to s 179(1) of the Companies Act 1993 
that a named individual be appointed to investigate a company's records. The Court may 
make such an order if it is satisfied that the creditor is acting in good faith, that the proposed 
inspection is to be made for a proper purpose and that the person to be appointed is a proper 
person for the task.[20] Even if a creditor is only recognised as having standing to seek 
information relating to an application that he or she is able to make under the Act,[21] an 
investigation may incidentally reveal information concerning a breach of duty by the 
company's director(s). This information is likely to come to the Court's attention as the person 
appointed to conduct the investigation is, pursuant to s 179(3), directed to make a "full 
report" to the Court. Section 179(4) provides that the Court may make such order relating to 
the disclosure or use of the information as it thinks fit. It is conceivable that the Court could 
order such information be disclosed to the company's shareholders who may elect to take 
action against the director(s). If the information is disclosed to the applicant creditor then it 
could be used as a basis for an application that a liquidator be appointed on the grounds that 
the company or board has persistently or seriously failed to comply with the Act, or, that it is 
just and equitable to do so.[23]  
III. The Factors to Which the Court Must Have Regard 
Section 165(2) of the Companies Act 1993 provides that, when determining whether to 
exercise its discretion to grant leave to an applicant shareholder or director, the Court shall 
have regard to: 
A. The likelihood of the proceedings succeeding: 
B. The costs of the proceedings in relation to the relief likely to be obtained: 
C. Any action already taken by the company or related company to obtain relief: 
D. The interests of the company or related company in the proceedings being 
commenced, continued, defended or discontinued as the case may be. 
These criteria take the form of a practical checklist that an individual might follow when 
making a decision whether to commence proceedings. The legislation makes it clear that the 
factors in s 165(2) do not limit the residual discretion of the Court to grant leave - assuming 
that the other requirements in s 165 are made out.[24] This recognises that the circumstances 
of every company will be different and that there may well be situations where the negative 
aspects associated with one or all of the criteria in s 165(2) may be outweighed by other 
positive reasons supporting the commencement of proceedings. Such an approach also 
explains the diversity of results to date in the New Zealand cases. 
Fisher J first considered the criteria in s 165(2) in the High Court in Vrij v Boyle.[25] Here 
the applicant's complaint on behalf of the company was that Boyle, the defendant director and 
majority shareholder, had diverted custom and opportunities of the company to another 
business he and his family had set up. The plaintiff sought leave to commence proceedings in 
the company's name for breach of fiduciary duty against Boyle, Boyle's wife (also a 
shareholder), and Boyle's children who were involved in the new business. 
Fisher J considered all of the criteria in s 165(2) but that in s 165(2)(a) - the likelihood of the 
proceedings succeeding - received the greatest attention. Fisher J said of this criterion that it 
did not require him to conduct an interim trial of the merits of the proceedings. Instead he 
adopted the standard utilised by Walton J in Smith v Croft, that is, the test "which would be 
exercised by a prudent business person in the conduct of his or her own affairs when deciding 
whether to bring a claim."[26] Fisher J added 
22. that a prudent business person would consider such matters as the amount at 
stake, the apparent strength of the claim, the likely costs and prospect of executing 
any judgment - matters that were not specifically mentioned in Smith v Croft. Fisher 
J's test certainly recognises the practical consideration that the decision to commence 
proceedings will be affected by many factors and that the likelihood of entry of 
judgment is just one such factor. However, it has to be said that there seems little 
justification for such a wide interpretation of this particular criterion given the 
existence of the other, and overlapping criteria, to which the Court is directed to have 
regard in the remainder of s 165(2). Further, it seems odd not to recognise that the 
"prudent business person test" must also have application to the other criteria in s 
165(2). 
When applying the prudent business person test to the facts before him Fisher J did only 
focus on the likelihood of judgment being given in the company's favour. He rejected the 
proposed claim against Boyle's wife and sons on the grounds that neither owed fiduciary 
duties to the company. In relation to the proposed claim against Boyle, Fisher J referred to the 
existence of affidavit evidence, which if accepted, would take the plaintiff's claim in respect 
of the alleged breach of fiduciary duty some distance. Fisher J also expressed the unsolicited 
view that "[i]t is also just conceivable ... that there is some form of contract between the 
company and Mr Boyle and that this contains an implied duty of fidelity which might give 
rise to a parallel cause of action in contract." However, this statement must be taken in a 
context where the consideration of the other factors in s 165(2) all favoured the 
commencement of proceedings. 
McFarlane v Barlow,[27] like Vrij v Boyle, concerned a company that was still trading - a 
company that was, in fact, extremely profitable. The applicant shareholders sought leave to 
commence proceedings against the directors of the company alleging breaches of their 
statutory duties to act in good faith and to use their powers for a proper purpose and, 
additionally, alleging breach of fiduciary duty. Master Venning accepted that the claim was 
arguable. Here, as in Vrij v Boyle, a consideration of the other factors in s 165(2), as well as 
the substantial size of the proposed claim, supported the commencement of proceedings. 
The remaining cases have all involved companies that had ceased trading and here the rate of 
applicant success has been mixed. Elias J in Techflow (NZ) Ltd v Techflow Pty Ltd [28] took 
the sensible view that all of the criteria in s 209X(2) of the Companies Act 1955[29] ought to 
be considered from the point of view of a prudent business person. Techflow involved an 
application for leave to defend an application to rescind an interim injunction issued in the 
District Court arising out of a disputed understanding of an agreement between shareholders 
and directors as to how a company that had ceased trading would have its affairs wound up. 
Elias J rejected the application on a number of grounds. One fundamental reason for refusing 
leave was that the wording of the statute did not allow leave to be granted in respect of 
proceedings issued in the District Court. Elias J also expressed the obiter view that a prudent 
business person would not have commenced proceedings in this instance because the costs of 
the litigation (some $5300 to date) were disproportionate to the amount at issue (some 
$17,000). This represents a justifiable shift in relation to the interests seen as represented by 
the company. At the date of the application it appeared that there were sufficient funds to 
meet the claims of all creditors but that these funds could well be eroded if the company had 
to meet the costs of the proposed proceedings - the applicant having made it clear that the 
main reason why leave was sought pursuant to s 165 was so that the company, rather than he, 
would meet the costs of the proceedings. 
In Thorrington v McCann,[30] in contrast, the company had operated a tavern that it leased 
from a third party. The applicant, who held 50% of the shares in the company, alleged that 
the director and the other 50% shareholder had renewed the lease for the benefit of another 
company that he had since incorporated. The applicant sought leave to commence derivative 
proceedings claiming an account of a profit that the proposed defendant had made by use of 
his fiduciary position vis a vis the company. There was no challenge to the facts as alleged by 
the applicant. Laurenson J accepted that the rules regarding accounting of profits made by 
those in a fiduciary position were clear and strict.[31] Further, Laurenson J held that the other 
factors in s 165(2), as well as the fact that the size of the claim was substantial and the 
chances of recovery were good, supported the commencement of proceedings. It seems that 
the nature of the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was also significant - Laurenson J noted 
when considering the interests of the company that it was "desirable as a matter of principle" 
that this matter be resolved.[32]  
The specific criteria in s 165(2) can be compared with the more general criteria in Canadian 
legislation which provide that the Court must be satisfied of three factors before granting 
leave.[33] First, there is a procedural requirement, of which the equivalent provision is s 
166(3) of the Companies Act 1993,[34] that the complainant must have given reasonable 
notice to the directors of the company of his or her intention to apply for leave if the directors 
do not diligently take action. 
The second requirement is that the complainant be acting in good faith. It has been held that 
the onus on the applicant to demonstrate good faith is a high one but which can be met if the 
applicant can show that she or she is not motivated by a private vendetta or that the action is 
not frivolous or vexatious.[35] Self interest, in the sense that the interests of the company and 
the applicant are both met by the commencement of proceedings against the director(s) 
allegedly guilty of wrongdoing does not, of itself, constitute bad faith.[36] Although the 
requirement of good faith has no direct equivalent in the New Zealand legislation one would 
expect that an objective consideration of the factors in s 165(2) would give no support to an 
applicant seeking to pursue a claim that could be categorised as frivolous or vexatious or who 
was acting in his or her own interests when those interests did not accord with those of the 
company. 
Finally, the Canadian courts must be satisfied that the proposed action appears to be in the 
interests of the company. Despite the breadth of this last criterion the focus has been placed 
squarely on the chances of judgment being given in the company's favour and, as will be 
seen, an applicant does not have to establish that the chances of success are particularly high. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal has said that the claim must be an "arguable one"[37] 
and emphasised that the wording of the legislation does not require that the proceeding be in 
the interests of the company but only that it appear that they be so. In Acapulco Holdings Ltd 
v Jegen[38] the Alberta Court of Appeal said that statutory wording "plainly indicates that 
certainty is not needed." Other courts have held that the bringer of the action must adduce 
sufficient evidence to show that a possibility that the alleged wrongs occurred[39] or that the 
applicant has raised "fair questions"[40] or that the action has a "reasonable chance of 
success."[41] In McKenzie v Craig,[42] Medhurst J, after reviewing many of the tests 
described above, held that the proper test was that the applicant must show that the proposed 
action in the company's name is not bound to fail. These tests use language not unlike that 
employed in Vrij v Boyle[43] and Macfarlane v Barlow[44] to describe the likelihood of 
judgment being entered in the company's favour. But, as already noted, in the New Zealand 
cases a host of other factors, including the chances of recovery and the size of the claim in 
relation to the likely costs, were also taken into account in the making of the decision as to 
whether the applicant should be granted leave. 
However, to leave the comparison at this point creates a misleading impression for there is 
evidence that the Canadian courts have utilised the issue of who is to bear the costs of the 
proceedings as a practical gate- keeping mechanism to prevent proceedings that will result in 
no real benefit to the company from continuing. The Canadian legislation provides that "the 
court may at any time make any order it thinks fit including ... an order requiring the 
corporation or subsidiary to pay reasonable legal fees incurred by the complainant in 
connection with the action."[45] A number of factors have been accepted as having a bearing 
on whether an order be made that the company meet the reasonable costs of the proceedings. 
The first is the financial standing of the applicant. In Johnson v Meyer[46] it was held that an 
order for costs was only appropriate when an applicant would otherwise be unable to 
continue the proceedings on his or her own account because of a lack of the necessary 
finances. The rationale behind such a view is not difficult to discern but was clearly 
articulated by Tysoe J in Intercontinental Precious Metals Inc v Cooke:[47]  
Many decisions in the course of litigation in my view are influenced by attendant legal 
costs and it is appropriate in my view that the person having the conduct of a 
derivative action should make the legal decisions bearing in mind that they will not 
necessarily be reimbursed for the legal costs. 
Further, in Intercontinental it was accepted by Tysoe J that the proposed proceedings were 
unlikely to be cost effective in the sense that the legal costs associated with the proceedings 
were likely to outweigh any recovery. He continued:[48]  
The matter of the legal fees will, in a sense, be the litmus test for this proceeding. If 
IPM and Mr Quam are prepared to prosecute the derivative proceeding with the risk 
that they may not be reimbursed for the legal costs incurred by then, it will tend to 
substantiate their positions that they are acting in good faith and that they do believe 
the pursuit of the action to be in the best interests of [the company]. 
In New Zealand, in contrast, section 166 of the Companies Act 1993 provides that, on the 
application of a shareholder or director granted leave to bring or intervene in proceedings on 
a company's behalf, the Court shall order that the whole or any part of the reasonable costs of 
the proceedings be met by the company unless the Court considers it would be unjust or 
inequitable for the company to bear those costs. The issue of costs has not been the subject of 
detailed discussion in the New Zealand cases to date. In MacFarlane v Barlow[49] and 
Thorrington v McCann[50] orders were made that the company meet the reasonable costs of 
the proceedings and in Vrij v Boyle[51] and Porritt v Weir[52] the issue of costs was reserved 
pending the outcome of the derivative proceedings. In Porritt v Weir the appropriateness of 
such an order was conceded by the applicant but this is not surprising given that an 
application to appoint a liquidator was pending and the applicant's further concession that if a 
liquidator was appointed then it might well be unjust for any award of costs to be made 
pursuant to s 166. 
Overall, this writer's preference is for the New Zealand system. It is debatable whether the 
preparedness of an applicant to meet the costs of the proceedings is a consistently accurate 
indicator of his or her good faith and the interests of the company. It takes no account of the 
situation where an applicant is pursuing what he or she might discern as being "the principle 
of a matter" and is not concerned with issues such as the costs of the proceedings in relation 
to the recovery sought. It also shifts a considerable part of the final decision to commence 
proceedings from an independent body to an individual who more than likely has a personal 
interest, whether or not it is financial, in pursuing the alleged misconduct on the part of a 
director. 
On a different note, in the New Zealand cases to date the wrongdoers together with the 
individuals seeking leave to bring or intervene in proceedings pursuant to s 165 have either 
made up or controlled the entire shareholding of the proposed plaintiff companies. It is, 
however, possible to envisage a scenario where there may be independent shareholders 
and/or directors who have a view as to whether the interests of the company will be met in 
pursuing the proposed proceedings. In Bellman v Western Approaches Ltd[53] the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal accepted that regard must be had to the decision not to proceed by 
so-called independent directors but added that the Court had to consider whether their 
decision was, in fact, made impartially. Here the Court found that the so-called independent 
directors were not truly impartial as they had been appointed though the voting power of the 
same group of shareholders that had appointed, and who retained close connections to, the 
directors allegedly guilty of misconduct. A similar approach was taken by Walton J in the 
context of the common law derivative action in Smith v Croft[54] but where a different 
conclusion was reached as to both the independence of the directors and fullness and 
impartiality of the report they had relied upon in reaching their decision not to go ahead with 
the proposed proceedings. There is one small sign that this sensible approach is likely to be 
followed in New Zealand - in AIDC Ltd v ANZ Banking Group New Zealand Ltd Master 
Thomson set out, without disapproval, a submission made on behalf of the proposed 
defendant that "the Court should be reluctant to grant leave to the applicant to bring an action 
in the absence of evidence of improper refusal or failure of the board ... to investigate and 
pursue any legitimate action."[55]  
IV. The Factors the Court Must be Satisfied of 
Pursuant to s 165(3) of the Companies Act 1993 the Court can only grant leave to an 
applicant to bring or intervene in proceedings in a company's name if it is satisfied that either: 
A. The company or related company does not intend to bring, diligently continue or 
defend or discontinue the proceedings as the case may be; or 
B. It is in the interests of the company that the conduct of the proceedings should not be 
left to the directors or to the determination of the shareholders as a whole. 
The Court does not hear from the applicant alone. Notice of the application must be served on 
the company or related company which may appear and be heard with respect to the 
application.[56] Further, s 165(5)(b) provides that the company must inform the Court 
whether it intends to bring, continue, defend or discontinue the proceedings. 
Given that all of the applications for leave pursuant to s 165 in New Zealand have been made 
in the case of closely held companies where the applicant is a minority or 50% shareholder 
the Courts have had no difficulty in concluding that s 165(3)(a) has been made out. In general 
terms the criteria in s 165(3) are likely to met when the alleged wrongdoers make up or 
control a majority shareholding. In these circumstances the company is likely to inform the 
Court that it does not intend to take proceedings. If those in control indicate that the company 
does intend to take proceedings then it may be that the Court will be satisfied that either the 
company does not intend to diligently continue the proceedings or that it is not in the interests 
of the company that control of the proceedings be left to the directors or shareholders as a 
whole. 
V. The Residual Discretion 
Even if the Court is satisfied that a consideration of the factors in s 165(2) favour the 
commencement of proceedings and that one or more of the mandatory criteria in s 165(3) are 
met it retains a discretion as to whether leave will be granted to an applicant shareholder or 
director. In New Zealand, to date, the most common submission made under this head is that 
the Court ought to refuse leave because the applicant is also seeking personal relief from the 
company and/or the proposed defendant director and this will lead to double recovery by the 
applicant.[57]  
In Vrij v Boyle[58] the applicant shareholder had already commenced proceedings seeking 
personal relief in respect of an array of other causes of action including the prejudiced 
shareholders remedy in s 209 of the Companies Act 1955.[59] Fisher J said:[60]  
One can well understand that if a shareholder tried to recover both personal damages 
for indirect losses caused by a reduction in the value of the shareholder's shares due 
to a wrong done to the shareholder's company and a derivative action with respect to 
the same wrong, there would be duplication and the risk of double recovery. 
Fisher J distinguished the above situation from one where an applicant was also seeking 
personal relief in respect of an independent wrong done to him or her. In the end Fisher J 
categorised the claim for relief under the prejudiced shareholders remedy as one where the 
shareholders would "resolve their differences inter se." This, in his view, was no reason for 
refusing to allow the company to pursue an independent claim against Boyle. 
Fisher J's treatment of this issue follows the commonly accepted boundary between a 
personal and corporate cause of action against a director.[61] However, it takes no account of 
the historical role of the prejudiced shareholders remedy in New Zealand. Prior to the 
enactment of the Companies Act 1993 the prejudiced shareholders remedy, along with the 
application to appoint a liquidator on the just and equitable ground, were viewed as 
alternatives to the derivative action as it existed at common law.[62]  
Holden v Architectural Finishes Ltd[63] is a recent example of the prejudiced shareholders' 
remedy being used to grant individual relief in respect of a wrong done to the company. In 
Holden it was held that the formation of a competing company by directors was a breach of 
their fiduciary duties to the company but also constituted oppressive conduct that was 
deserving of relief for the reason that it "severely prejudiced" the value of the applicant 
shareholder's investment.[64] In practical terms the wrongdoing directors were penalised for 
their conduct in the form of an order that they purchase the applicant's shares at a price that 
reflected the value of the company prior to the conduct categorised as "oppressive". Although 
technically this is not an order of damages it did have the effect of returning the minority 
shareholder to the financial position he enjoyed prior to the oppressive conduct. If the 
approach in Holden and like cases continues, and there is no statutory signal that it should 
not, then there must be little incentive for shareholders to seek leave to bring a derivative 
action where there is an allegation of wrongdoing by a director. The only clear benefit in 
bring derivative proceedings is the possibility that an order may be made that the company 
bear the costs of the proceedings.[65] Further, again assuming the approach in Holden 
continues, in the case of a wrong suffered by the company but where an applicant under the 
prejudiced shareholders remedy cannot establish oppression then the odds are that he or she 
will receive no personal benefit, even in an indirect way, from a successful derivative 
action.[66] In such circumstances it would be a very rare individual who would seek to 
pursue an action in the company's name and for the company's, rather than his or her, benefit. 
In Canada, where the statutory derivative action and prejudiced shareholders remedy have 
existed alongside each other for over two decades, a different attitude prevails. The existence 
of an application for relief pursuant to the prejudiced shareholders' remedy is a factor to 
which courts have paid little heed when considering an application for leave to bring 
derivative proceedings. Although it is accepted that there may be circumstances where there 
is overlap between the two, rather more attention is paid to whether an applicant is entitled to 
relief under the prejudiced shareholders head if he or she is seeking relief for conduct that 
could well be the subject of derivative proceedings than vice versa.[67] In Pappas v Acan 
Windows Inc, for example, Barry J said:[68]  
I do not accept, however, that what would normally be a derivative action may be 
justified simply because the sort of remedy sought is available under the oppression 
remedy sections of The Corporations Act. In my opinion, before a shareholder can 
place himself within the oppression remedy sections of The Corporations Act, the 
shareholder must first pass the hurdle or meet the condition that ... "a finding of 
oppression or unfairness first opens the door to the exercise of the Court's 
discretion." And I do not believe that oppression or unfairness can be established 
merely by showing that the corporation itself has been damaged, with consequential 
damage to the shareholder. In that sense, there will always be damage found to occur 
to shareholders. To permit a personal action under the oppression remedy sections of 
The Corporations Act in all such cases would be to eviscerate the derivative action 
sections of the Act. 
In the case of a closely held company that is unlikely to continue trading the question as to 
whether the boundaries of a corporate cause of action and an application for personal relief 
ought to be strictly maintained at least deserves consideration. An order for personal relief 
avoids returning funds to an entity that may still be controlled by the wrongdoer and may 
simply pre-empt the next step in the company's existence, that is, the distribution of its assets 
in the course of liquidation.[69] The New Zealand legislation does, however, provide a way 
of maintaining a strict division between a corporate and personal cause of action while still 
allowing a commonsense result. Section 167(d) of the Companies Act 1993 expressly 
authorises the Court, when it has granted leave to an applicant to bring or intervene in 
proceedings in a company's name, to order that any amount finally ordered to be paid by a 
defendant in the proceedings be paid to former or present shareholders of a company rather 
than to the company.[70]  
Even if a change in attitude to the circumstances in which relief is granted under the 
prejudiced shareholder remedy occurs, the role of the statutory derivative action is 
undermined by other provisions in Part IX of the Companies Act 1993. Pursuant to s 164 a 
director, shareholder or entitled person may seek an order restraining a company or a director 
of a company from engaging in conduct that would contravene the Companies Act 1993, the 
Financial Reporting Act 1993 or the company's constitution.[71] Further, shareholders are 
given standing pursuant to ss 170 and 172 of the Companies Act 1993 to seek an order 
requiring a director or the board to take action required to be taken by the Companies Act 
1993, the Financial Reporting Act 1993 or the company's constitution. In Canada the possible 
conflict between the derivative action and these other enforcement mechanisms has been 
resolved in the same manner as that between the derivative action and the prejudiced 
shareholders remedy. In Re Goldhar and Quebec Manitou Mines Ltd Reid J concluded, albeit 
reluctantly, that the compliance order procedure did not confer alternative or concurrent 
rights with the statutory derivative action and that shareholders who sought to enforce the 
obligations imposed upon directors by statute must utilise the derivative procedure.[72] Reid 
J also expressed the view that the making of a compliance order ought to be reserved for 
""mechanical omissions" of a type that might lend themselves to summary disposition."[73] 
Even if the second limitation is accepted it does not resolve the difficulty that ss 164, 170 and 
172 of the Companies Act 1993 make no mention of the derivative action and are phrased 
sufficiently broadly to overlap with it.[74]  
The place of the statutory derivative action is still further undermined by s 177(4) of the 
Companies Act 1993. Section 177 deals, in the main, with the issue of ratification by 
shareholders or others of the exercise of a power vested in them by a director or the board. 
However, s 177(4) provides: 
Nothing in this section limits or affects any rule of law relating to the ratification or 
approval by the shareholders or any other person of any act or omission of a director 
or the board of the company. 
This section has been the subject of detailed comment by this writer elsewhere.[75] In 
summary, it has the arguable effect of making the statutory derivative action unavailable in 
respect of a breach of duty or other misconduct by a director that at common law the majority 
of shareholders were able to ratify.[76] This is a restriction for which there appears to be no 
valid justification. The common law rules relating to ratification developed as a gate-keeping 
mechanism. With the introduction of the statutory derivative action there appears to be no 
need for the retention of these common law rules - the Court acts as a replacement gate-
keeper. In Canada, sensibly, statute provides and case law recognises that ratification of an 
alleged breach of duty is merely a factor to which a court may have regard when exercising 
its discretion to grant leave to an applicant to bring or intervene in proceedings on a 
company's behalf.[77]  
One further factor that has been raised in passing in New Zealand in the context of the Court's 
residual discretion is whether leave ought to be granted to an applicant who was not a 
shareholder at the time that the alleged wrong to the company occurred and who purchased 
his or her shares at a fair price, that is to say, a price that took into account the effect of the 
misconduct on the value of the company's assets. One view is that if leave is granted to 
applicants within this category then it encourages speculative actions that result in an unjust 
enrichment to those who were not shareholders at the date the alleged wrong occurred.[78] In 
MacFarlane v Barlow Master Venning expressed the obiter view that in the case of a 
misappropriation of company assets there is no objection in principle to shareholders who 
acquired their shares after the misappropriation from seeking leave to bring derivative 
proceedings.[79] The fact that there is no such legislative limitation was seen as the 
determining factor in Canada where leave has been granted to an applicant who admitted 
acquiring shares in a company so it could challenge past actions of the company's 
directors.[80]  
Whether the concerns relating to speculative actions and unjust enrichment are justified 
depends on how one assesses the interests represented by a company. The identified concerns 
only achieve significance if one equates a company with its current body of shareholders. 
Even if such a view prevails then the director(s) guilty of misconduct can still be penalised 
and unjust enrichment of current shareholders avoided by the making of an order pursuant to 
s 167(d) that any final recovery be paid to the former shareholders who sold their shares at an 
undervalue. In any case there is a strong argument that it is unjust not to allow a company 
that is continuing to trade to seek compensation for a wrong done to it - any recovery will 
clearly benefit it as a trading entity. 
VI. Conclusion 
This purpose of this article was to assess the effectiveness of the statutory derivative action in 
the Companies Act 1993 in terms of the enforcement of directors' duties both in the wider 
context in which it operates and as a stand alone enforcement mechanism. When the action is 
considered in isolation, using the Canadian statutory derivative action as comparative 
measure, favourable conclusions can be drawn. The New Zealand action incorporates many 
desirable features of its Canadian counterpart - such as the ability to order that recovery be 
made directly to shareholders or former shareholders - and avoids some areas of difficulty. 
Thus, unlike its Canadian counterpart, the New Zealand action is not made available those 
who are more likely to have a conflict between their own interests and those of the company. 
Further, the overall approach in New Zealand to the decision whether to grant leave to an 
applicant is far more pragmatic than its Canadian counterpart - the factors the Court takes 
into account are far wider and the Court retains a far greater control over the final decision as 
to whether the proceedings should be commenced. 
On a wider assessment a quite different impression emerges. The place of the statutory 
derivative action in New Zealand is not yet clear but the indications are that it is 
overshadowed by a number of factors not present in Canada. First, it was introduced into a 
system where the prejudiced shareholders remedy plays a recognised role in compensating 
shareholders who have suffered through a breach of duty owed by a director to the company. 
There is no statutory signal that the prejudiced shareholders remedy is no longer to operate as 
an alternative to the derivative action. second, the statutory derivative action is further 
circumscribed by the retention of the common law rules relating to wrongs by directors that 
are ratifiable by a majority of shareholders and by the inclusion of new overlapping remedies 
such as the compliance orders specified in ss 170 and 172 of the Companies Act 1993. Given 
this context the only clear benefit to an applicant shareholder in going through the effort of 
making application for leave pursuant to s 165 is the possibility of an order that the Court will 
order that the company meet the reasonable costs of the proceedings. Thus, the effectiveness 
of the statutory derivative action in New Zealand in terms of the enforcement of directors' 
duties is theoretical rather than practical, and if the status quo remains, is likely to continue to 
be so. 
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